On the Theory and Measurement of Relative Poverty Using Durable Ownership Data^{*#}

Sudeshna Maitra Department of Economics York University 4700 Keele Street Toronto ON M3J 1P3 Canada Email: <u>smaitra.econ@gmail.com</u> (preferred)

maitra@yorku.ca

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[#] Technical appendices are available at www.sudeshna.maitra.com.

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ABSTRACT

What drives household spending choices on durable goods? Why do consumption classes arise and what determines their number? What does it mean to be poor?

In this paper, we propose an economic theory of household decision-making that links these questions. We develop a dynamic overlapping-generations model where households choose between investing in education, which increases subsequent income, and investing in durables, which increases observable wealth (a signal of 'social status') and thus increases the probability of finding a high-income marriage partner.

We show that the steady state distribution of household durable expenditures in this model exhibits natural clusters, which may be interpreted as 'classes'. Furthermore, we show that certain households – viz. those in the lowest class – may be unable to take advantage of either the labour market (via education) or the marriage market (via durables), offering a new perspective on long-term poverty. Our theoretical predictions are consistent with empirical findings obtained using a mixture model of durable ownership on Indian National Sample Survey data (1993-94 to 2004-05).

The contribution of this paper is threefold: (1) we establish a theoretical model linking household choice, patterns in durable goods ownership, class formation, and long-term poverty; (2) we validate the use, in previous and current empirical research, of durables-based mixture models as a tool for identifying classes; and (3) we build a framework for generating testable hypotheses around the long-run effect of policy changes (such as income transfers or education subsidies) on poverty.

Finally, we introduce a novel and innovative methodology – of (1) using a theoretical model as the foundation of a data-generating process for synthetic observations, and (2) using observed patterns found in the synthetic data to help interpret empirical outcomes found in survey data. As such, we extend the use of economic theory to help understand the observed behaviour of economic agents in very complex dynamic settings.

1. Introduction

The measurement and identification of poverty has long been of special interest to development economists. Typically, this involves the definition of a poverty line – a level of income or expenditure – such that all households that are below this level are identified as 'poor' (Deaton (1997), Ray (1998)). When income or expenditure data is unavailable, testing for the presence of assets in households has been suggested as an alternative method for poverty measurement (Filmer and Pritchett (2001); McKenzie (2005), Stifel and Christiaensen (2007), Filmer and Scott (2008), Montgomery et al (2000), Townsend (1979)).

In the latter category of measuring poverty by asset ownership, Maitra (2016, 2017) uses a mixture model to identify clusters in the durable ownership patterns of urban households in India. Maitra's mixture analysis finds that there are 3 clusters ('classes') in this population, each with its own density of durable ownership; the lowest class (who own the fewest durables on average) can then be identified as the (relatively) poor¹.

Maitra's (2016, 2017) analysis is performed on 3 rounds of urban household survey data from the National Sample Survey (NSS) collected in 1993-94, 1999-00 and 2004-05, and finds 3 classes in each case. In this paper, we extend this analysis to rural households in the NSS over the same survey periods, and replicate the finding

¹Maitra's (2016, 2017) papers are motivated by an attempt to examine what happened to poverty in India in the 1990s, following the economic liberalization of 1991. India's National Sample Survey (NSS) data, from which poverty-line-based poverty estimates have traditionally been derived, used a new set of recall periods in its questionnaires in 1999-00 compared with previous years. This led to concerns that the expenditures reported by households were not comparable between the 1993-94 and 1999-00 rounds (Deaton and Kozel (2005)). Since durable ownership data in the survey bypassed the issue of recall periods – being based on a question that asked about durables in use at the time of the survey – the mixture approach using durable data provided a method for comparing the size of the lowest class in 1993-94 versus 1999-00. An additional advantage of the mixture approach lay in the fact that it did not necessitate the imposition of an externally set poverty 'line' – the various classes were identified purely based on natural clusters in the data.

of clear clusters in durable ownership: 2 rural classes in 1993-94, 3 in 1999-00 and 4 in 2004-05. In addition, we find that the class definitions obtained in the 2004-05 rural sector are remarkably similar to the class definitions in the urban sector in 2004-05 and 1993-94.

The immediate questions we ask in this paper stem from the above findings.

Why should there be such clusters (or classes) in durable ownership patterns, whether rural or urban? What determines the number of clusters – i.e. the existence of 2 versus 3 or 4 classes – of durable ownership? What factors might determine a 'steady state' pattern of durable ownership that returns over time and across sector, despite a temporary displacement (as in urban India in 1999-00)? In other words, what kind of *theoretical* relationship between durable ownership and economic wellbeing (thence, poverty) could explain what we find about durable ownership patterns in the Indian NSS data?

The answers to these questions are of interest not only to explain the mixture findings for post-liberalization India but for a deeper reason: they would illuminate the underlying economic relationship between durable accumulation and economic well-being, that can inform the process of measuring poverty. While assets have long been used to define and measure economic well-being and poverty (Filmer and Pritchett (2001); Filmer and Scott (2008)), there have, to our knowledge, been few attempts to examine *why* or *how* the accumulation of such assets is related with the same. In this paper, we attempt to address the gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model of asset ownership (specifically, durable ownership) over time, *in the context of poverty measurement*. Our immediate goal is to answer the central questions posed above on why there are natural clusters in durable ownership and what drives a long run (steady state) pattern of such ownership. The long-term goal of this paper is to develop a framework for understanding the relationship between durable accumulation and poverty over time; one that can be extended based on specific applications and used to understand the effect of policy changes on durable ownership and poverty in the long run^2 .

We develop an overlapping generations model that incorporates and utilizes three specific characteristics of durable good consumption in India. First, durable items constitute an easily observable component of a household's consumption. We assume, in particular, that the durables owned by a household act as a signal of its social status; higher social status leads to higher income through matching with a "highquality" spouse of the marriageable generation³. Second, durables provide a stream of consumption value over time, so that the observed durable goods owned by a household at any time may have been accumulated over more than one generation. Third, durable goods do not last forever, i.e. they depreciate over time, ensuring a limit on the accumulation effect described above.

In our model, households have two channels for enhancing future income (and potentially escaping poverty) – the labor market and the marriage market. Choosing (costly) education allows a higher expected labor-market return, but spending on additional durables (instead of education) signals a higher social status which increases expected marriage-market return. The optimal choice clearly depends on which of

²We hope also that our approach will contribute a clue to answering the even larger philosophical question (see Sen (1983)) – how do we measure capabilities (represented by income) or the lack thereof, using observations on commodities (durable goods)? Poverty addresses a constraint in income or capabilities, but commodities are clearly a *choice* that depends on preferences as well as income constraints. The economic model at the heart of our methodology takes the decision-making process of households explicitly into account.

³There is ample reference to the norm of arranged marriage prevalent in India, which has also been documented to be a form of social networking by matching (see Maitra (2018), Banerjee, Duflo, Ghatak and Lafortune (2013), Luke, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2004)). Households care about the social standing of their relatives by marriage, which could be tied to the latter's caste and religion but also the wealth they own. There are certainly mutual visits to the prospective bride's and groom's homes by each party before a marriage is finalized. Connections made by marriage result in transfer and generation of income and wealth (as gifts, dowry, job referrals, etc). In our framework, we conceptualize durable ownership as the observable component of family wealth which influences the quality of connections that can be made through marriage.

the two expected returns is higher relative to its cost. This depends, in turn, on the quantity of durables already accumulated by older generations in the household, since it is *total* durables in a household at any time that signals its social status. We assume, moreover, that in any period, households must meet a subsistence consumption level (C) first, before they can spend on education or durables. The subsistence level C is, therefore, the theoretical counterpart of the (consumption or expenditure) poverty line. Households who earn below C (and who are, therefore, in "absolute poverty") choose 0 durables. Those that have an excess of income beyond C choose high education if it is optimal. The residual income in either case is assigned to durables⁴.

The optimal choices made by households in any period can be used to define a stochastic process, which then becomes a data-generating process for observations on durables accumulated by households. Given any set of parameters, we can derive the transition matrix and the steady state distribution of "states" (viz. all possible choices of durable ownership). A synthetic sample of "data" can then be drawn from the steady state distribution. This synthetic sample allows us to examine various aspects of the distribution of durable ownership driven by the labor and marriagemarket incentives inherent in our model.

We find that the distribution of durable ownership in the synthetic sample shows natural clusters which may be 2, 3 or 4 in number depending on parameter values (Figures 3a-d). These then are the theoretical counterparts of the "classes" that are captured by the mixture model using Indian NSS data. In addition, we are able to demonstrate certain relationships between parameters that are likely to generate

⁴The only savings and investment opportunity in this model is that in human capital (viz. education). Any income in excess of subsistence consumption is spent on durables if investing in human capital is not optimal. High income households may be seen to invest in education (if it is optimal) as well as own non-zero durables.

different numbers of classes. We do not claim that these relationships are the only explanations for observing different numbers of classes in different populations, but they serve as an example for tests that may be developed to explain the class phenomenon in durable ownership. Our model also provides an explicit framework for predicting the effects of policy changes involving changes in the various parameters.

As an example, here is a situation where there might be 2 classes of durable ownership in a population. Suppose there are two possible levels of income that may be earned – high (w_H) and low (w_L) – and two possible levels of education to choose from - low (with cost 0) and high (with cost E). High education and higher observed durable ownership each leads to a higher probability of receiving w_H . Thus, in any period t, a household may earn a low income $(2w_L)$, a mid-level income $(w_L + w_H)$ or a high income $(2w_H)$ depending on education level and the durables accumulated (which results in a high-income partner by marriage). We assume that the probability of marriage market success (i.e. matching with a high-income partner) increases with durables owned but not at a constant rate. In particular, there is a generally acknowledged "social standard", say β , such that the probability of securing a high-income partner increases the most when the household crosses from $(\beta - \epsilon)$ to $(\beta + \epsilon)$ durables $((\epsilon > 0 \text{ and small})^5$. Now suppose that the social standard β is high relative to incomes earned $(2w_H)$ in a particular society⁶. This makes it hard for households in this society to achieve a high-income partner, making the very high household income $-2w_H$ – a rare occurrence. If the cost of education (E) is high as well, we may well observe only 2 classes of durable ownership in this society – defined

⁵We assume, in particular, that the probability of securing a high-income partner is given by the normal CDF $\Phi(\beta, \sigma^2)$, where σ^2 (an exogenously given parameter) determines the "skepticism" around the belief β . See Figure 1.

⁶One can envisage this happening if the price of procuring or using durables is inordinately high, e.g. due to poor provision of public goods such as good roads or a reliable supply of electricity. Indeed, we find 2 classes in the mixture for rural households in NSS, 1993-94, where these conditions could plausibly apply.

by the level of durables chosen by low-income $(2w_L)$ households with no education and that chosen by middle income $(w_L + w_H)$ households, also with no education. The durable ownership levels of the few high-income households that are obtained by chance will form the right tail of the upper-class distribution of durables in this setup. A society where β is low compared with incomes $(2w_L)$ can similarly demonstrate 2 classes, although the levels of durable ownership corresponding to the classes will be higher (since now the 2 higher incomes – $(w_L + w_H)$ and $2w_H$ – become more likely to be observed). When β lies between $2w_L$ and $2w_H$, we are likely to find 3 (or even 4 classes) instead of 2.

Our findings establish the theoretical underpinnings of natural clusters in durable ownership choices, which confirm that a mixture model – which can identify such clusters – is a valid method for identifying the poorest group in a population. In addition, we show that an interesting feature of the assumption on social standards (β) is the fact that spending the marginal dollar on durables (and not on education) yields the highest increase in expected future return, when previously accumulated durable levels are close to $(\beta - \epsilon)$. This implies that households with accumulated durable levels that are much lower than – or much higher than – β have the strongest incentive to invest in education. Hence, households that are observed to be accumulating small positive levels of durables instead of spending on education, are doing so because they cannot afford education even though education is their optimal choice. In other words, these "low-income, low-durable" households are likely to be vulnerable to poverty due to their inability to access either the labor market or the marriage market to improve economic well-being. In this sense, the group of "relatively poor" households ought to include those that have a small non-zero level of durables, and not just those that have none (the group in "absolute poverty"). Indeed, we find this to be true in the definitions of the lowest class in the mixture results from India.

The main contribution of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework that explains the relationship between durables accumulation and economic well-being (thence poverty) in a way that directly informs the process of poverty measurement. We demonstrate a potential mechanism – viz. signaling with durables – that could generate clusters in durable ownership data; we also provide an argument for why the lowest cluster observed might contain households who are vulnerable to poverty even when they earn higher than the subsistence consumption level. Our arguments provide a strong justification for using durables-based mixture models to identify classes in a population. The lowest class identified by a mixture model could be reasonably interpreted as the group that is in relative poverty in the population in question. Finally, our methodology is innovative and demonstrates a novel approach for bridging theoretical and empirical economics in development applications.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical findings using the mixture model for rural India using NSS, rounds 1993-94, 1999-00 and 2004-05. We note some interesting parallels (and differences) between our findings for the rural sector versus Maitra's (2016, 2017)) findings for urban India. In Section 3, we present the theoretical model with overlapping generations, and in Section 4, we simulate observations on durable ownership from the theoretical data-generating model. Our main findings connecting the theoretical and empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4.2; we provide an interpretation of the empirical mixture estimates in the context of our theoretical model in Section 4.3. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Empirical findings

In this section, we present and extend the results reported in Maitra (2016, 2017) based on the mixture model. Maitra (2016, 2017) uses the urban subsamples of the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) to document the distribution of total durable ownership in three periods: 1993-94, 1999-00 and 2004-05. This time period is of special interest, since India introduced a substantial liberalization policy in 1991 which resulted (among other things) in the opening up of trade. During this time, therefore, durable goods became more easily available for purchase within the country. Maitra (2016) uses 8 durable goods – fan, radio, television, bicycle, fridge, air-conditioner, motor bike and car – to define a total number of durables (Y) observed to be in use in urban households in each of the 3 periods.

The three component mixture model (see Maitra (2016, 2017) for details) postulates the existence of 3 classes in the urban population. Each class *i* has a class-specific binomial density ϕ_i of durable ownership with parameters (8, p_i), where p_i represents the probability with which a class -i household owns a durable in each of the 8 independent draws. Clearly, $p_L < p_M < p_U$, where L, M, U represent the lower, middle and upper classes respectively. The probability of drawing an urban household with y durables is therefore given by

(1)
$$P(y) = \pi_L \phi_L(8, p_L) + \pi_M \phi_M(8, p_M) + \pi_U \phi_U(8, p_U)$$

where π_i denotes the proportion of class-*i* households in the urban population. Solving the maximum likelihood problem with an EM algorithm (Maitra (2016, 2017)) yields estimates of the class-proportions (π_L, π_M, π_U) and class-specific ownership probabilities (p_L, p_M, p_U)⁷.

⁷Mixture models can be plagued by the issue of observational equivalence, which is the general

Table 1 presents the estimates of $\{\pi_i, p_i\}$ for urban subsamples in years 1993-94, 1999-00 and 2004-05⁸. As discussed in Maitra (2016, 2017), a mixture model with 3 classes was able to produce the best fit to the urban data from the years considered (as opposed to 2 or 4 classes). An interesting observation from these estimates is that while the definition of each class (as encapsulated in p_i) changes between 1993-94 and 1999-00, it returns very close to the original (1993-94) class-definitions in 2004-05. This suggests the existence of a "steady state" distribution of class-specific densities ϕ , to which the distribution of durables reverts after an initial adjustment phase in 1999-00.

We repeat the mixture analysis of Maitra (2017) to obtain estimates of $\{\pi_i, p_i\}$ for the rural subsamples of NSS, over the same 3 years – 1993-94, 1999-00 and 2004-05. Interestingly, we find (see Table 2) that in 1993-94, a *two* component mixture model describes the rural distribution better than one with three classes. Three components provide the best fit in 1999-00, but in the final year 2004-05, a model with *four* classes does better than one with two or three⁹.

Yet another interesting finding from the rural results is that in the final year, class definitions (as expressed by p_i) are once again remarkably similar across rural and urban sectors. This suggests that there may have been some sort of "barrier" between rural and urban sectors in 1993-94 that governed the accumulation of durables in these regions. This barrier seems to have disappeared or at least dissipated by 2004-05, generating very similar class definitions across rural and urban sector households.

We take away three important observations from the empirical findings in Tables

ambiguity surrounding the assignment of estimates to classes (e.g. how do we know that class 1 is L, class 2 is M and class 3 is U?). The problem does not exist in the current application since, by definition L is the class with the lowest p_i , U the class with the highest p_i etc. See Maitra (2016) for a detailed discussion.

⁸These estimates are reproduced from Maitra (2017).

 $^{{}^{9}}LR$ tests (Greene (2002)) are used to determine the number of classes for each sample.

1-2. First, mixture models do very well in explaining durable ownership data in urban and rural India over three periods of time. This suggests that there are natural clusters in the data representing total durables in a household, which are captured by the mixture model, sometimes with 3 components and sometimes with 2 or 4. Second, there appears to be a steady state in class definitions in urban India, suggested by the very similar class definitions obtained therein in the first and third years. Finally, there is a similarity in class definitions *across* urban and rural India in the final year, suggesting easing of some barrier between the two sectors over the time considered.

The observations above lead to three pertinent questions. Why are there clear clusters (or classes) in durable ownership patterns? What determines the existence of 2 versus 3 or 4 classes of durable ownership? Finally, what factors could determine a 'steady state' pattern of durable ownership that persists over time, despite temporary displacement?

In the next section, we present a theoretical model of household choice of durable spending that attempts to answer these questions.

3. The model

Consider an overlapping generations model in which every household is defined by three generations – 0 (child), 1 (parent) and 2 (grandparent). In any period t, the earners and decision-makers in a household are the parents (generation 1), while children and grandparents (generations 0 and 2) are dependents. Parents choose the level of education of their children and the amount of durables they wish to purchase, ensuring, first, that a level of subsistence consumption, C (> 0), is met. The common household utility of members in any period t is given by

(2)
$$U(B_t) = C + B_t$$

where B_t is the total amount of durables present in the household in t. Note that B_t includes the amount of durables purchased by parents in period t as well as that accumulated by grandparents in period (t-1). When grandparents pass so do the durables they accumulated when they were parents (in period (t-1)).

Household income in any period is the sum of incomes of two parents: one who was born and raised in the household in question and the other that married into the household. The income of the parent born in the household is low (w_L) or high (w_H) depending on two factors: (1) whether that parent is of low or high productivity $(\alpha_L$ and α_H , respectively) and (2) whether s(he) has high or low education $(e_H \text{ and } e_L)$, respectively. The productivity level α_{t-1} of the generation of parents in period tis determined randomly at the time of their birth (in (t - 1)) and is unobservable. We assume that productivity is α_L with probability q_L (α_H otherwise). Likewise, the education level of the period-t parents is determined by the amount invested in it by *their* parents when they were children, i.e. in (t - 1). We denote the wage of the parent raised in the household by w_1 and refer to it as the household's 'labour income'.

The income of the parent who marries into the household is assumed to depend on the social standing of the household, which determines marriage market success. We assume that marriages are arranged and that households with higher social standing – as measured by the amount of durables observed to be in use in that household (B_t) – attract partners with higher wage¹⁰. In particular, we assume that a household

¹⁰The literature on the effects of observable (or conspicuous) consumption on well-being and growth mostly assumes that these effects stem from the fact that households care about relative consumption (Becker et al (2005), Friedman and Ostrov (2008), Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), Moav and Neeman (2010), Xia (2010), Alvarez-Cuadrado et al (2011)). We deviate from this literature in the assumption that the observability of durable consumption serves as a 'signal' for the social status of households, which facilitates matching in the marriage market. Thus, observable consumption in our model affects utility through an increase in real household income instead of a sense of satisfaction from "keeping up with the Joneses".

that has B durables in any period will attract a partner with high wage w_H with probability $\Phi_S(B)$, where $\Phi_S(B)$ is the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution $N(\beta,\sigma^2)$. The latter assumption has the following interpretation (see Figure 1). In any period, there is a certain level of durables ownership, β , that is generally acknowledged to mark households of high social standing. The skepticism around this common belief is represented by σ^2 . Thus, while higher durable ownership B increases the probability of attracting a partner with high wage, the rate of increase in the probability is highest at the level $(\beta - \epsilon)$ ($\epsilon > 0$, small). Moreover, the higher the skepticism (σ^2) regarding the common social standard β , the lower is the increased probability of acquiring a high-wage partner at most levels of accumulated durables B, around β . An example of a society with low skepticism (or low σ^2) would be one where everyone agrees unanimously on the connection between durables and social standing, such as might be likely in small, close-knit communities in rural settings. Higher skepticism could occur in more anonymous communities such as might exist in urban settings. We will henceforth refer to $\Phi_S(B)$ as the signal function under beliefs $S = (\beta, \sigma^2)$, where β denotes the social standard and σ^2 denotes the skepticism regarding β . Further, we denote the wage of the parental partner by w_2 and call it the household's 'marriage market income'¹¹.

Household income in period t can, therefore, be written as $I_t(e_{t-1}, \alpha_{t-1}, B_{t-1})$, where e_{t-1} is the education level of period-t parents, α_{t-1} is their (random) productivity level and B_{t-1} is the total number of durables in the household (indicating its social standing) when period-t parents were matched in the marriage market. In

¹¹Unlike Maitra (2018), we do not explicitly model the matching of partners where the (equilibrium) probability of matching is determined by the number of agents of all types present in the economy. The assumption here that more durables (or higher observable wealth) leads to higher social standing which in turn leads to more wealth, is no more than an assumption of "wealth begets wealth" where the level of wealth is signalled by the observable consumption of durables by households.

particular,

(3)
$$I_t(e_{t-1}, \alpha_{t-1}, B_{t-1}) = w_{1t}(e_{t-1}, \alpha_{t-1}) + w_{2t}(B_{t-1})$$

where w_{1t} (labour income in period t) is w_H with probability $p(e_{t-1}, \alpha_{t-1})$ (w_L , otherwise) and w_{2t} (marriage market income in t) is w_H with probability $\Phi_S(B_{t-1})$ (w_L , otherwise); $S = (\beta, \sigma^2)$. We assume

$$(4) p(e_L, \alpha_L) = p_1$$

(5)
$$p(e_L, \alpha_H) = p_2$$

$$(6) p(e_H, \alpha_L) = p_3$$

$$(7) p(e_H, \alpha_H) = p_4$$

$$(8) 0 < p_1 < p_2 < p_3 < p_4 < 1$$

Household expenses (E_t) in any period consist of three components: (1) the subsistence consumption level C that must be met, (2) the investment in education of the generation of children in that period, and (3) the expenditure on durables:

(9)
$$E_t = C + c(e_t) + b_t$$

where $c(e_t)$ represents the parental generation's spending on education and b_t is the spending on durables in period t. We assume that there are two possible levels of education e_t – high (e_H) and low (e_L) – and that the cost $c(e_t)$ of providing the same are E (> 0) and 0, respectively. We also assume that there are no savings opportunities, so the residual household income after spending C and $c(e_t)$ is used to purchase durable goods.

The timing of income-realization and decision-making is as follows. At the beginning of any period t, parents find themselves with (realized) income I_t based on the education level and productivity of one parent (α_{t-1}, e_{t-1}) , and the wage of the other parent determined by the household's durables level B_{t-1} . Given income I_t , parents choose their children's education level e_t and the amount to spend on durables b_t in order to maximize their lifetime utility $[U(B_t) + \delta U(B_{t+1})]$, where δ (ϵ (0, 1)) is the discount factor. At the end of period t, the current generation of children (with education e_t) enters the labor market and earns w_t based on their productivity draw and the education e_t they have received. In addition, the *total* quantity of durables $(B_t = b_{t-1} + b_t)$ in the household in period t determines the wage of their partner by arranged marriage: w_H with probability $\Phi_S(b_{t-1}+b_t)$, w_L otherwise. The sum of own wage and partner's wage determines the household income of the parental generation I_{t+1} in the next period.

The optimization problem of the parental generation in period t can be written as:

(10)
$$\max_{\substack{(e_t,b_t)}} U(b_{t-1}+b_t) + \delta U(b_t+b_{t+1})$$

subject to

(11)
$$c(e_t) + b_t \le I_t(e_{t-1}, \alpha_{t-1}, b_{t-1} + b_{t-2}) - C$$

(12)
$$b_{t+1} = I_{t+1}(e_t, \alpha_t, b_t + b_{t-1}) - C - c(e_{t+1})$$

(13)
$$e_t \ge 0, \ b_t \ge 0$$

Notice how the period-t decision variables (e_t, b_t) impact the decision makers' (parents') lifetime utility. The spending on children's education e_t represents a tradeoff between current and future consumption, since it involves an expenditure now that increases income (potentially) in the future (11 - 12). However, the spending on current durables b_t improves consumption now as well as in the future since, (i) it increases direct consumption utility in both periods (10) and, (ii) it also increases the potential of higher income (hence, consumption) in the future (12).

It is easy to see that solving the optimization exercise in (10) - (13) under the model assumptions reduces to ascertaining which of the two education levels $(e_H$ or $e_L)$ generates a higher lifetime utility for the decision maker, conditional on their realized income (I_t) and their inherited durable stock (b_{t-1}) . The residual income after spending on this optimal education level and subsistence consumption is assigned to durables. We can show that households choose the higher education level (e_H) if the following condition holds:

(14)
$$(1+\delta)E + \delta(w_H - w_L)[q_L(p_1 - p_3) + (1 - q_L)(p_2 - p_4) + (\widetilde{p} - \widetilde{p}_e)] < 0$$

where $\tilde{p} = \Phi_S(b_{t-1} + I_t - C)$ and $\tilde{p}_e = \Phi_S(b_{t-1} + I_t - C - E)$ are the values of the signal function under $S = (\beta, \sigma^2)$ when e_L (with cost 0) or e_H (with cost E) is chosen, respectively.

Condition (14) has the following interpretation. The first term on the left-hand side captures the increase in direct consumption in both periods if the cost of high versus low education (E) is allocated to current durables spending instead of education. The increase in durables consumption lasts for two periods since durables chosen now remain in the household for two periods. The second term on the left-hand side embodies the impact of low versus high education on future income. Choosing the high education level e_H increases the probability of securing the high wage w_H in future (relative to choosing e_L), whether the random productivity draw is α_L (with probability q_L) or α_H . Thus, the first two terms in the square bracket in (14) capture the effect of low versus high education on lifetime consumption through future labour income w_1 . Choosing e_H has a cost, however, which reduces durables consumption now and, through it, the social standing of the family in the future. This impacts the probability of finding a future partner with a high wage. The last term in the square bracket in (14) captures this effect, viz. effect of low versus high education on partner's wage, or marriage market income, w_2 , via the signal $S = (\beta, \sigma^2)$.

Note that condition (14) varies by household only due to the last term $(\tilde{p} - \tilde{p}_e)$. This term captures the effect of the durables-based signal of the household's social standing on the partner's income, viz. the effect of durables on marriage market outcomes. Labour market incentives are determined completely by pre-specified parameter levels. Given a set of parameters, therefore, the incentive to choose education (and hence current durable expenditure) depends on the amount of durables already accumulated by previous generations.

The model outlined in (2)-(14) describes a stochastic process $\{b_{t-1}, b_t\}$, driven by parameters $(w_H, w_L, p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4, \beta, \sigma^2, q_L, \delta, E, C)$. In this straightforward model, total household income in any period t could take one of 3 possible values $-(2w_L)$, $(w_L + w_H)$ or $(2w_H)$. For each of the 3 values of household income, there are 2 possible choices for durable expenditure (b_t) , corresponding to whether education level e_L or e_H is chosen in t. (The choice of education e_t depends on condition (14).) Thus, in any period t, durable expenditure b_t could take one of 6 (= 2 × 3) possible values. Furthermore, for each of the 6 possible values of b_t , there are (similarly) 6 possible values of b_{t-1} . These comprise 36 (i.e. 6^2) "states" that $\{b_{t-1}, b_t\}$ can pass through in any period t. Thus, the transition matrix P that governs the movement from (b_{t-1}, b_t) to (b_t, b_{t+1}) is of order (36×36) .

To show the existence of clusters in household durable ownership, let us make the additional simplifying assumption that $C = 2w_L$, which implies that households with the lowest income level $(2w_L)$ can barely afford to pay for subsistence consumption; hence they always choose $e_t = e_L$. This reduces the possible values that b_t can take, to 5 (instead of 6). This leads to $5^2(=25)$ possible "states" and a transition matrix of order $(25 \times 25)^{12}$.

Let $\theta_1, \theta_2, ..., \theta_{25}$ denote the 25 possible "states" or values that the process $\{b_{t-1}, b_t\}$ can pass through in any period t. Note that each θ_i (i = 1, 2, ..., 25) has, associated with it, an amount of total durables $(b_{t-1}^i + b_t^i)$ observed in a household in state θ_i in period t^{13} . Furthermore, let $x_t = (x_{1t}, x_{2t}, ..., x_{25t})$ denote the proportions of households in states $\theta_1, \theta_2, ..., \theta_{25}$ respectively, in the population in period t $(0 \le x_{it} \le 1, \sum_{i=1}^{25} x_{it} = 1, i = 1, 2..., 25)$. Thus, households' transition through various states of durables expenditure can be written as:

Moreover, the steady state distribution of durables expenditures over states $(\theta_1, \theta_2, ..., \theta_{25})$, denoted by $x^* = (x_1^*, x_2^*, ..., x_{25}^*)$, will satisfy the condition:

$$(16) x^*P = x$$

¹²The individual terms of the (25×25) transition matrix P are provided in technical appendix 1. ¹³Clearly, $(b_{t-1} + b_t)$ is not unique across the 25 states, since any household that has (b^0, b^1) will be observed to own the same amount of total durables as a household with (b^1, b^0) . These 2 households would, however, have very different transition probabilities to other possible states since the durables accumulated by grandparents plays a role in determining the optimality of education (condition (14)). Hence, we retain the 25 states in defining the transition process (15). It is easy to show that there are 12 unique values of total durables corresponding to the 25 states of the model (see technical appendix 2).

It can be shown that the stochastic process described above does converge to a steady state (Tsokos (1972)). Recall that our object of interest in this analysis is the total amount of durables in a household in a given period. The theoretical counterpart of this object of interest is B_t , the total real expenditure on durables observed in a household in a given period (recall that each state θ_i (i = 1, 2, ..., 25) corresponds to a specific value of total real durable expenditure). The empirical counterpart, on the other hand, reports on the total quantity of durables observed in a household (Section 2). We have no particular theory of durable prices in our theoretical model and are reluctant to invoke assumptions on the same; hence our inferences from the theoretical model will pertain to real durable expenditure, not quantities.

The next section describes how simulation data on household durable expenditure can be generated from the model presented above.

4. Simulations & Results

4.1 Drawing samples from the data-generating process: an example

The following example demonstrates how the model above functions as the data generating process from which empirical observations are drawn. Suppose parameter values are as follows.

Example 1. $w_H = 100, w_L = 10, p_1 = 0.1, p_2 = 0.3, p_3 = 0.4, p_4 = 0.8, \beta = 150, \sigma = 110, q_L = 0.5, \delta = 0.5, E = 11.5, C = 20.$

The (25×25) transition matrix P and the steady state distribution corresponding to the above parameter values have been derived in the technical appendix. Figure 2(a) plots the derived steady state distribution – the x axis showing $(b_t + b_{t-1})$, i.e. the total durable spending observed in any time t and the y axis showing the proportion of households that would be observed with each level of total durables (spending) in the steady state under parameters as in Example 1¹⁴.

Figure 2(a) shows the theoretical steady state distribution – or the data-generating process – that corresponds to given parameters in Example 1. It is possible now to draw samples from a population that is distributed as in Figure 2(a) (i.e. the theoretical steady state distribution). For example, Figure 2(b) plots the histograms of durable expenditures observed in two samples of 1000 observations, drawn independently from the steady state distribution in Figure 2(a).

The process described in Figures 2(a)-(b) - viz. deriving the theoretical steady state distribution and drawing samples from the same – outlines the essence of the simulation exercise we will execute below.

4.2 Results

Suppose that urban (or rural) India is made up of multiple "regions" that correspond to different values of parameters. Suppose there are 1000 such regions. This implies that there are 1000 sets of regional parameters ($w_H, w_L, p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4, \beta, \sigma, q_L, \delta, E, C$), each of which is assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution over a given parametric range. Hence, we can derive 1000 data-generating processes or theoretical steady state distributions (such as in Figure 2(a)). Suppose also that the sampling process is able to draw 1000 observations from each of the 1000 data-generating processes. Pooling these observations generates a sample of a million observations from the urban (or rural) sector. This sample is a "theoretical" counterpart of empirical household datasets available for analysis, such as the urban (or rural) sub-sample of the NSS.

¹⁴The x axis of Figure 2 shows the 12 unique levels of total durables associated with the 25 states in the stochastic process (15) - (16) (see footnote 13).

Figure 3(a) plots the histogram of the pooled sample for the following range of parameters (Set A). (The distribution of each parameter over the specified range is uniform.)

Example 2. *(Set A)* $w_H \in (80, 120), w_L \in (5, 20), p_1 \in (0, 0.5), p_2 \in (p_1, 0.5), p_3 \in (0.5, 1), p_4 \in (p_3, 1), \beta \in (100, 500), \sigma \in (100, 500), q_L = 0.5, \delta = 0.5, E \in (10, 100), C = 2w_L.$

The separation of observations into clusters – or durable-spending "classes" – is immediately evident in Figure 3(a). Notice that in Example 2 (or Set A), the ranges of w_H and w_L do not overlap; this generates the clear separation in the histogram of observations from the lowest class (with 0 durable spending) and the middle class; and the middle class and the next higher class. Consider a set of parameters – called Set B – which is identical to Set A except that $w_L \in (5, 80)$, i.e. the ranges of w_L and w_H do intersect. In the histogram corresponding to the pooled sample from Set B (Figure 3(b)), the gaps between the classes appear to close. Moreover, while there is a possibility of there being 3 – 4 classes in Figure 3(a), the histogram in Figure 3(b) reflects 2 – 3 classes¹⁵.

Consider a third set of parameters – Set C – as follows.

Example 3. *(Set C)* $w_H \in (80, 120), w_L \in (5, 80), p_1 \in (0, 0.5), p_2 \in (p_1, 0.5), p_3 \in (0.5, 1), p_4 \in (p_3, 1), \beta \in (500, 3500), \sigma \in (100, 500), q_L = 0.5, \delta = 0.5, E \in (10, 100), C = 2w_L.$

Set C differs from Set B only in that the social standard β is very high compared with the ranges of income (low and high). In Sets A and B, the social standard β

¹⁵The fewer observable clusters or "classes" in Figure 3(b) could be driven by the fact that allowing the ranges of w_H and w_L to intersect lowers the overall dispersion between the same (i.e. low and high wages) in Set B (compared with Set A).

lay within the achievable range of incomes in the labour and marriage markets. The histogram corresponding to Set C in Figure 3(c) shows a shrinkage in the proportion of higher levels of durable spending and a separation into 2 rather than 3 clusters. This situation is akin to the mixture estimates we obtain in rural India in 1993-94.

How does one interpret the phenomenon of a very high β ? One explanation could simply be that the price of owning durable items is extremely high in rural areas due to high transportation or operational costs (e.g. bad roads, unreliable electricity supply). Another explanation could be that durables are *not* an effective signal for marriage market success in rural India. It is not hard to envisage close-knit rural communities in which the social status (e.g. caste) of households is common knowledge; this would weaken any additional information that observable consumption (such as durable ownership) could provide about a household's social standing. In order for durable spending to matter beyond what is already known about each other, it would have to be inordinately high.

Thus, a very high β in rural India could explain the difference in mixture results between urban and rural India in 1993-94. The convergence to similarly defined classes in rural and urban India in 2003-04 could indicate a lowering of β in rural India to meet urban standards. The easier availability of durable goods post-liberalization leading to an effective fall in prices facing rural customers would appear to be an obvious explanation for this effect. Another factor in play could be greater geographical mobility, leading to greater social anonymity and the emergence of durable ownership as a more effective signaling mechanism. We do not claim, however, that a lowering of β is the only mechanism that could explain a movement from 2 to 3 classes in rural India. There could be alternative pathways (represented by shifts in other parameters) that could generate effects that match what we find in the empirical data. The more robust finding from the current analysis is the fact that household durable spending data exhibits natural clusters or "classes" when generated by the model in Section 3. The model exploits some intrinsic characteristics of durable goods – viz. their observability and the fact that they can be accumulated over time (before they depreciate completely). These characteristics coupled with the fact that durables serve as a signal for social standing, hence marriage market outcomes, are able to generate "classes" of durable spending.

Given the findings above, the mixture model seems like a natural choice of process for identifying classes – in particular, the lowest class – in durable ownership.

But, who are the households that constitute the lowest cluster in our economic model, and why should we care about them? Are households in the lowest cluster vulnerable to poverty in any way or simply disinterested in owning durables? How do we interpret the probabilistic nature of the empirical mixture estimates in the light of findings from the theoretical model? In the next section we discuss answers to these questions, in the context of the empirical results from Indian NSS.

4.3 Interpreting the mixture estimates based on the economic model

In this section, we interpret the empirical mixture estimates (Tables 1-2) in the light of predictions from the theoretical model of Section 3.

We derive (from the mixture estimates of p_i and π_i) the probability $\gamma_L(x)$ that households with x goods belong to the lower class¹⁶. The results are presented in Table 3. Notice, for instance, that households that have 0 - 2 durables in 2004 – 05 (both sectors) are likely to belong to the lower class with a somewhat large non-zero probability. However, these probabilities are not close or equal to 1. This means that not all households that have 0 - 2 durables belong to the lower class either. Can the

¹⁶It is easy to show that : $\gamma_L(x) = \frac{\pi_L \phi_L(p_L, x)}{\pi_L \phi_L(p_L, x) + \pi_M \phi_M(p_M, x) + \pi_U \phi_U(p_U, x)}$ (See Maitra (2016, 2017).

theoretical model in Section 3 provide an intuition for probabilistic estimates such as these? The answer – discussed in detail below – is yes.

First, let us outline who belongs to the lower class (the relatively poor) and if (and how) these households are different from those in absolute poverty. In our economic model, households in "absolute poverty" are those that barely earn the subsistence consumption level C in any period, and are, hence, likely to own 0 durables. It makes sense for these households to be included in the lowest class, since households in absolute poverty must also find themselves in the group of relatively poor (i.e. the lowest cluster). In the examples above (Sets A-C), we have assumed that subsistence consumption is equal to low-level incomes, $C = 2w_L$, in all regions from which data is drawn. Figure 3 shows clearly that, in these cases, the lower class (in relative poverty) includes households that have no durables. Thus, low-income households – all of whom have 0 durables and are in absolute poverty – are also the the likely group of the "relatively poor" in this population. Therefore, under the simplified assumptions made above, the groups of households in "absolute" and "relative" poverty may be roughly the same - viz. households that are too poor to afford a basic subsistence consumption. In general, however, there may be some regions in the population where $C > 2w_L$ and others where $C = 2w_L$. In the former case, our theoretical model predicts that some low-income households will be observed to accumulate a small (positive) number of durables. Indeed, the empirical results for rural and urban India (Table 3) indicate that lower-class households may own 0, 1 or 2 durable goods. In other words, we may have some low-income households with 0 durables (i.e. households in absolute poverty) but some that own more. This raises the question: in what sense could households with small positive levels of durables be considered to be "poor" (albeit in a relative sense), even when their incomes are above the (consumption) poverty line?

Our theoretical model provides an interesting insight on low-income households' vulnerability to poverty, even when their incomes are above the poverty line. A household may be considered to be vulnerable to poverty if it is unable to access either of the two channels for high-income (w_H) generation – viz. the labour market or the marriage market. Now consider (14) – the condition under which it is optimal to choose education e_H . The nature of the signaling function \tilde{p} (and \tilde{p}_e) imply that households with accumulated durables close to $(\beta - \epsilon)$ are most like to violate condition (14) (thereby choosing low education e_L). This is due to the fact that, for households who have already accumulated close to β durables, the additional dollar spent on durables is more likely to increase future income (by procuring a high-income spouse), than that spent on education. This means also, that households whose accumulated durable levels are much *lower* (or much higher) than β have the strongest incentive to acquire education (since, at their current level of owned durables, spending the marginal dollar on durables is not likely to increase expected marriage-market income by much *more* than it already is, relative to spending it on education). But this means that households who are observed to own a small positive level of durables may be doing so because they cannot afford education even though education is $optimal^{1718}$. In other words, households with small positive levels of durables may be vulnerable to poverty since they are unable to generate high income either in the labour market (due to being unable to afford education) or in the marriage market (due to low levels of accumulated durables). It is in this sense that households that own a small

¹⁷Note that for education to be optimal, E must be sufficiently small. However, as long as E > 0 there will be some levels of $2w_L(>C)$ such that households with that income find it optimal to choose education but cannot afford to do so.

¹⁸An interesting implication of education being optimal for poor households is that income increases in these households will be spent on education even at the cost E (i.e. subsidizing education is not necessary to induce poor households to choose education). This is consistent with reports of increased demand for enrolment in English-language schools in India post liberalization (Education World (2005), The Economic Times (2010), Cheney (2005)), along with increased employment of English-speaking youth in international call centers (BBC (2003), Arasu (2008)).

amount of durables could be interpreted as being vulnerable to poverty – i.e. being in "relative" poverty – even when they are not in absolute poverty¹⁹. This finding is certainly reflected in the empirical results for rural and urban India, which show that the lower class may contain households with 0 - 2 durable goods (Table 3).

Why then are *all* households with 0 - 2 durable goods *not* considered to be vulnerable to poverty (and hence be considered to be "relatively poor"? The answer to this question lies in the fact that not all households with a small positive number of durables may come from low-income households. For example, we might observe, say x durables (x > 0, small) in low-income households from some regions (who would prefer to choose education if they could afford it) or middle-income households in other regions (for whom education may or may not be optimal). In the former case, the households would be clearly considered to be vulnerable to poverty but this is not so clear in the latter situation. The mixture approach is able to capture this fact in its probabilistic assignments of class conditional on durable ownership²⁰. Thus, the durables-based mixture approach recommends itself once more as a reasonable process for identifying and understanding relative poverty in a population, including the size and characteristics of the most vulnerable households.

In a poor and developing nation, the group of households in relative poverty (the lowest class) may have a large intersection with the group of households in absolute poverty. When this is the case, the durables-based mixture approach could be used to approximate the group of absolutely poor households, without necessitating the

¹⁹Note that households with accumulated durables much higher than β may be unable to afford (optimal) education too if they are unlucky enough to draw a low income in the current period. However, the previously accumulated quantity of durables acts as a buffer for poverty as it gives them a relatively high probability of marriage market success in the next period.

²⁰Note also that some households that have 0 durables may also be middle-income households who can just afford education (and hence accumulate 0 durables). These households would not belong to the category of the absolute or relatively poor. This phenomenon too is captured by the mixture model in its probabilistic assignment of household to class, conditional on durable ownership.

imposition of an externally determined "poverty line". This is useful especially when data on income or expenditure are hard to obtain or compare over time. As a country develops and incomes grow, however, we might expect the group of households in relative poverty to diverge from the group in absolute poverty. We could then use the mixture model described above to capture and visualize the divergence and how it changes during the development $process^{21}$.

In addition to explaining the phenomenon of classes and relative poverty, the model framework described in Sections 3-4 could provide a valuable tool for understanding policy effects on durable accumulation (and hence on relative poverty). Here are some questions, beyond the scope of this paper, that could be answered using our approach. Could poor households be jolted out of their poverty by a policy of providing free education (e = 0 for households with income $2w_L$)? Would providing free education be sufficient for poverty reduction or would we need to ensure also that the education is *effective* in securing a job (e.g. raise p_2 and p_3)? How would the effect of providing free education to the poorest households differ from that of giving them an income subsidy? We hope our framework will be useful to development researchers as well as practitioners for answering questions such as these and more.

5. Conclusion

We show, in this paper, that durable accumulation data generated from a theoretical model of marriage-market signaling exhibits natural clusters interpretable as classes. The mixture model – used in earlier research to measure relative poverty in urban India in the 1990s – is, therefore, an ideal framework for identifying classes in durable accumulation data. We argue, using intuition from the theoretical model,

²¹Could we "estimate" an expenditure-based relative-poverty line based on households in the lowest cluster identified by the durables-mixture model? This and related questions are subjects of our ongoing research.

that the lowest class identified by a mixture model – interpretable as the relatively "poor" – are the most vulnerable to poverty even when they are able to earn more than the poverty-line subsistence income. This is because these households are unable to access high incomes either through the labor market or social networks such as the marriage market. The theoretical framework developed herein is also a valuable tool for identifying policy effects, which will allow us to test and answer important development questions such as those pertaining to the role of free education or subsidy to the poor.

The main contribution of this paper is, therefore, that it establishes a vital link between the theoretical relationship between durable accumulation and poverty, and the practical process of measuring poverty using durable ownership data. We hope that the framework and insights generated herein will motivate future research on assets-based poverty measurement, including the role of policy in alleviating the same.

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Assumption: $\Phi_s(X)$ (where S = (β , σ)) represents the probability that the marriageable generation in a household with durables β will find a partner that earns the high wage, when skepticism around the belief β is given by σ .



Figure 2(a): Steady state distribution of household durables, derived for parameters as in Example 1

Figure 2(b): Histograms from samples independently drawn from the theoretical distribution in Figure 2(a)









Figure 3(a): Pooled sample from data generated using Set A parameters (Example 2)

(wH and wL ranges do not intersect, beta is within attainable income range)



Figure 3(b): Pooled sample from data generated using Set B parameters



(wH and wL ranges intersect, beta is within attainable income range)



Figure 3(c): Pooled sample from data generated using Set C parameters (Example 3)

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Table 1: Mixture results, Urban subsamples of NSS

Year		Class proportion	Binomial ownership probability	
	Class 1	0.323	0.085	
	Class 2 0.647		0.313	
1993-94	Class 3	0.029	0.643	
(urban)	Observations	17239		
	Likelihood	-30493.9		
	Class 1	0.200	0.035	
	Class 2	0.621	0.341	
1999-00	Class 3	0.179	0.590	
(urban)	Observations	48924		
	Likelihood	-95047.9		
2004-05 (urban)	Class 1	0.161	0.079	
	Class 2	0.603	0.340	
	Class 3	0.235	0.627	
	Observations	43356		
	Likelihood	-86451.9		







Year		Class proportion	Binomial ownership probability	
	Class 1	0.880	0.130	
1993-94	Class 2	0.120	0.359	
(Rural)	Observations	17452		
. ,	Likelihood	-25273.3		
	Class 1	0.316	0.000	
1000.00	Class 2	0.554	0.274	
1999-00	Class 3	0.131	0.523	
(Rural)	Observations	71385		
	Likelihood	-122760.65		
2004-05 (Rural)	Class 1	0.247	0.075	
	Class 2	0.355	0.182	
	Class 3	0.345	0.363	
	Class 4	0.053	0.633	
	Observations	75941		
	Likelihood	-135842.2		

Table 2: Mixture results, Rural subsamples of NSS



Predicted vs. Actual Distributions, Rural 2004-05





Table 3: Probability of lower-class membership by durables owned, NSS,1993-04, 1999-00, 2004-05*

of Durables Owned	199	3-94	1999-00		2004-05	
(x)	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural
0	0.832	0.988	0.871	0.879	0.793	0.624
1	0.502	0.957	0.320	0.000	0.386	0.336
2	0.170	0.857	0.031	0.000	0.092	0.116
3	0.040	0.615	0.002	0.000	0.015	0.026
4	0.008	0.299	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.004
5	0.001	0.102	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
6	0.000	0.029	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
7	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
8	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Total No. Probability that household with x durables belongs to the lower class

* Derived from mixture estimates reported in Tables 1 & 2.

	1993-94				
	ι	ırban	rural		
Total Durables Owned	Freq	Rel Freq U	Freq	Rel Freq R	
0	3296	0.191	4869	0.279	
1	4044	0.235	6831	0.391	
2	3924	0.228	3282	0.188	
3	3041	0.176	1589	0.091	
4	1843	0.107	629	0.036	
5	716	0.042	205	0.012	
6	279	0.016	39	0.002	
7	80	0.005	7	0.000	
8	16	0.001	1	0.000	
Observations	17239		17452		

Data Appendix: Distribution of Total Durables Owned, NSS India

1999-00

	U	ırban	rural		
Total Durables Owned	Freq	Freq Rel Freq U F		Freq Rel Freq R	
0	8419	0.172	25618	0.359	
1	6692	0.137	9220	0.129	
2	8743	0.179	13400	0.188	
3	9600	0.196	11124	0.156	
4	7592	0.155	6275	0.088	
5	4540	0.093	3907	0.055	
6	2413	0.049	1440	0.020	
7	806	0.016	339	0.005	
8	119	0.002	62	0.001	
Observations	48924		71385		

2004-05

	urban		rural	
Total Durables Owned	Freq	Rel Freq U	Freq	Rel Freq R
0	4565	0.105	16218	0.214
1	6486	0.150	19315	0.254
2	7831	0.181	16002	0.211
3	8670	0.200	11215	0.148
4	6623	0.153	7173	0.095
5	4721	0.109	3611	0.048
6	3020	0.070	1712	0.023
7	1217	0.028	583	0.008
8	223	0.005	112	0.002
Observations	43356		75941	